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The application of Operations Research in the medical field has been the key
to save more lives in a variety of decision-making problems. With the aid of mathe-
matical models and algorithms developed for specific problems, we can now develop
plans and polices, and take decisions that can lead to optimal or near optimal so-
lutions. This is the case of the Kidney Exchange Problem addressed in this thesis.
Recently, a new idea has arisen for those patients with renal disease in need of a
transplant and have a willing but incompatible donor. Let us suppose we have two
incompatible patient-donor pairs (PDPs), that is, in each pair, the donor is not com-
patible (blood type or crossmatch) with the recipient; however, the donor of pair A
is compatible with the recipient of pair B, and the donor of pair B is compatible with
the recipient of pair A. Then they can swap kidneys and both pairs would benefit
from this exchange. This exchange is called a cycle and has cardinality 2. This may
xiii

Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Barter exchange markets
Barter exchange is one of the oldest and most straight forward forms of economic
activity [32]. It concerns the direct trading of one product or service for another, in
other words, agents seek to swap their items with one another, in order to improve
their own utilities. We can consider various examples of barter exchange [20].
1. House exchange, where participants seek to swap homes.
2. Room exchange, where college students trade up for better roommates.
3. Car exchange, where participants seek to obtain better cars.
4. Book exchange, where readers seek to trade for new books for reading.
5. General barter exchange, where agents swap different goods or services.
There is many people outside wanting things who others may posses and prob-
ably are willing to exchange for some other item. However, it is sometimes hard to
find such good match that fulfills the need of both persons. It also may be the case
that you enroll a barter exchange market (e.g., house swapping) and you find and
1
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swap a house, then after swapping you find another more suitable house which if
you had made a bigger effort in seeking, you could have obtained more gain.
Digital market places may overcome these kind of complexities of finding such
coincidences of wants [32], where people sign up and post their needs and their pos-
sessions, so some other users me be interested in that item and therefore proceed
with the swapping goods. Some examples of these digital marketplaces may include:
www.mercadolibre.com, www.ebay.com, www.amazon.com, www.besthouseswap.com.
1.2 Kidney exchange and the clearing problem
1.2.1 Kidney disease
Kidney failure, also called end-stage renal disease (ESRD), is the last stage of chronic
kidney disease (CKD). When your kidneys fail, it means they have stopped working
well enough for you to survive without dialysis or a kidney transplant [3]. Leading
causes of kidney failure include diabetes in first place and high blood pressure in
second place.
After the diagnosis of ESRD is determined, a decision concerning the most
appropriate mode of renal replacement for the patient must be made. Options for
renal replacement therapy for ESRD may include kidney transplantation, peritoneal
dialysis and hemodialysis [15]. Kidney transplantation is the most desired and cost-
effective modality of renal replacement therapy for patients with irreversible chronic
kidney failure (end-stage renal disease, stage 5 chronic kidney disease) [1].
However, it is not that easy to find a good donor. There are certain constrains
that may make a willing donor incompatible with the recipient. Such constraints
are mainly the blood type compatibility and the crossmatch test. This last test
determines if the recipient has antobodies against the donor cells. If they do, they
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are crossmatch positive and the transplant is not carried out even if they are ABO
compatible (see Appendix A).
In the past, due to these complications, recipients did not have another choice
than signing up in the waiting list, where many of them died before receiving the
kidney. Later on, another alternative was proposed, which was to develop a kidney
barter exchange market, where recipients with willing but incompatible donors had
the posibility of enrolling such market creating a large pool of incompatible pairs.
The way the kidney exchange works is simple. Suppose we have an incompati-
ble pair, let us call it pair A, whose donor is compatible with recipient of pair B, and
the donor of pair B is compatible with recipient of pair A. Then they can “swap”
kidneys and both pairs would benefit from this exchange. This is called a cycle of
size two. Chains are also possible. These are explained in the next chapter.
1.2.2 Clearing problem
Given a set of agents, the objects they brought to the market, and the agent’s
reported preferences over objects, the clearing problem in barter exchange markets
is to determine an allocation of objects to agents so as to maximize the gains of trade.
In general, there may be side payments to compensate for unequal exchanges. Every
agent may for instance have an asking price for the good he brought to the market
and a maximum buying price for every good he is interested in [32].
Having stated the clearing problem, we can now implement this methodology
in the kidney barter exchange market, where we seek to obtain the maximum weight
matching or, in other words, the maximum number of transplants, all depending
on the approach or the algorithms implemented. Sometimes we seek for different
objectives. We will review other approaches besides the maximum weight matching
in the following chapters.
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1.3 Motivation and objective
Kidney barter exchange markets are nothing new. In the United States there are
distinct organizations that offer kidney exchange programs. The most important
organizations in the United States are [38]:
1. OPTN/UNOS Kidney Paired Donation Program. The vision of the
OPTN/UNOS Kidney Paired Donation Program is that every kidney trans-
plant candidate with an incompatible but willing and approved living donor
receives a living donor kidney transplant. The mission is to develop a suc-
cessful Kidney Paired Donation (KPD) program with universal access to all
UNOS/OPTN members that prioritizes the medical and psychosocial safety of
living donors and candidates.
2. Alliance for Paired Donation. The mission of the Alliance for Paired
DonationTM is to save lives by significantly reducing the wait time for a kidney
transplant through kidney paired donation.
3. National Kidney Registry. The mission of the National Kidney Registry is
to save and improve the lives of people facing kidney failure by increasing the
quality, speed, and number of living donor transplants in the world.
In the United States, the following statistics are known [38, 39]:
1. Over 3,000 new patients are added to the kidney waiting list each month.
2. 13 people die each day while waiting for a life-saving kidney transplant.
3. Every 14 minutes someone is added to the kidney transplant list.
4. In 2014, 4,761 patients died while waiting for a kidney transplant. Another,
3,668 people became too sick to receive a kidney transplant.
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Meanwhile in Mexico it is not much different. There are currently 21,510
registered individuals who need a transplant, from which more than half of them,
13,313 need a kidney transplant [12]. There are around 9.6 million individuals who
suffer from CKD in the early stages, while there are 140,000 with ESRD [28].
Chronic kidney disease is among the top ten of mortality in Mexico (according
to the IMSS) [36] and unlike the United States and other countries, Mexico does
not have a kidney barter exchange market. Currently, ESRD patients who do not
have a compatible donor, do not have another choice than sticking to the waiting
list, where many of them die before receiving a kidney. With the introduction of a
kidney barter exchange program, we would give another alternative and chance of
living to those patients.
The objective of this thesis is to motivate the implementation of a kidney
exchange program in Mexico, in order to give patients another opportunity to live.
We will assess the potential impact of a kidney exchange program for the next years
with the aid of a simulator.
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1.4 Contribution
A kidney barter exchange market sounds like a great idea. Unfortunately, to the best
of our knowledge, no database regarding incompatible pairs exists in Mexico. There
is certainly information of the individual patients waiting for a kidney; however, a
successful kidney exchange program would require patients bringing living donors
and compatibility information among pairs. In this thesis a computer program that
simulates the effects of kidney exchange programs is developed. The underlying
model includes data gathered from different sources from the Mexican population
such as blood type distribution, gender distribution, age distribution, and PRA
distribution (see Appendix B). This approach is based on a previous study carried
out by Gentry et al. [31] in the United States.
A brief description of the simulator is as follows: Basically we simulate potential
donors a patient might have, these potential donors include the whole family and
other not directly related or unrelated donors. Once we have the potential donors (2
potential donors are considered for each recipient), we proceed with the ABO test,
the medical work-up (this is to determine if donor’s kidney is healthy enough and if
the donor passes the psychological test) and the crossmatch test.
The possible outcomes for a patient are:
1. Patient goes to the waiting list (does not have a healthy willing donor)
2. Pair goes to exchange program (has an incompatible willing and healthy donor)
3. Pair goes to direct donation (has a willing, healthy, and compatible donor)
The simulator generates pairs until the stopping condition is met. This con-
dition is to reach a certain number of direct donations. A total of 30 repetitions
are carried out for statistical testing. Once the number of incompatible pairs is
estimated, we create a pool of incompatible pairs and optimize it with a clearing
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algorithm. This is to estimate an average of incompatible pairs that could be served
from a kidney exchange program. We also estimate the number of current incom-
patible pairs in the waiting list and, based on certain model assumptions, estimate
the behaviour of the waiting list for the following 10 years.
Chapter 2
Kidney Transplant Overview
2.1 History and legislation
Figure 2.1: First successful transplant from twins in 1954.
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2.1.1 History around the world
Transplantation is a recent phenomena. Many of the big developments in this disci-
pline have taken place within the past 40 years. Much of the story of transplantation
is a story of barriers and how modern scientific medicine overcame those barriers.
Here we present a time line that gives a brief outline of how transplantation pro-
gressed through this century [41].
Early experiments
1902 - The first sucessful experimental kidney transplants were performed at
the Vienna Medical School in Austria with animals.
1909 - The first kidney transplant experiments were performed in humans in
France using animal kidneys.
A surgeon inserted slices of rabit kidney into a child suffering from kidney
failure. Although “the immediate results were excellent” the child died about two
weeks later. While such transplants did sucessfully produce urine, they lasted only
for about an hour before ceasing to function. Scientists of the time believed kidney
transplants were possible, but their success was limited by unknown “biochemical
barriers,” which prevented long-term kidney survival.
1933 - The first human-to-human kidney transplant was performed
Unknown to doctors at the time, there were mismatches in donor and recipient
blood groups and the donor kidney never functioned
1940s - Sir Peter Medawar at the University of London experimented with the
immunologic basis of organ rejection.
Early 1950s - Cortisone-like medications were used to suppress the human
body’s self-defense system (immune system), resulting in some kidney transplant
success.
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The perfect match
1954 - Joseph Murray and his colleagues at Peter Bent Brigham Hospital in
Boston performed the first truly successful kidney transplant from one twin to an-
other. This was done without any immunosuppressive medication. A photograph of
this procedure is seen in Figure 2.1.
Scientists predicted that immune system reactions should be minimal between
identical twins (because their organs were indistinguishable to each other’s immune
systems). More kidney transplants between identical twins were successfully per-
formed, and some of those kidney recipients are still alive today.
Rejection perfection
Late 1950s - New approaches were needed to prevent the body from fighting
off a “foreign” donor kidney when an identical twin donor was not available.
1960s - Tissue typing advancements - Better techniques for matching donor
and recipient blood and tissue types, as well as improvements in preserving cadaveric
(from recently deceased donors) kidneys, were developed.
1961 - Immunosuppression advancements - Powerful immunosuppressives be-
came available and, in combination, helped decrease the chance for kidney rejection
1980s and 1990s - New tecniques, new medications and new patient informa-
tion have helped make kidney transplants a safer, more effective and more routine
procedure
Barriers
In order for sucessful kidney transplants to become a reality, science needed to
outwit the human body’s own defense systems.
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The procedure
First, surgeons had to develop a surgical procedure that would not only place
a new kidney in the patient, but connect all the necessary tubes and blood vessels.
This was largely done by surgeons such as Dr. Thomas Starzl.
Dialysis
Throughout all of this experimentation, there were other developments being
perfected that helped keep renal failure patients alive. This was called kidney dialysis
and it kept patients alive by using an artificial kidney to purify human blood, which
is what normal functioning kidneys do every day. In 1948 Dr. Willem Kolff first
used his Kolff-Brigham “artificial kidney” on human patients and set the stage for
innovative new approaches to controling renal disease.
Rejection
Scientists needed to learn why organs in our bodies rejected new organs. The
pioneering work in this field of immunology was largely done during the 1950s by
researchers such as Dr. Joseph Murray.
Immunosuppression
After scientists more accurately understood why our bodies fight off foreign
organs, they experimented with ways to combat these defences. Surgeons used X-
ray, bone marrow infusion, immunoparalysis, donor-recipient matching, and drugs
to stop rejection.
Organ preservation
Another crucial part of kidney transplantation is proper organ preservation.
Although today’s solutions and cooling methods can safely preserve kidneys for up
to 48 hours, there were times when surgeons rush organs from decapitated prisoners!
Chapter 2. Kidney Transplant Overview 12
2.1.2 History and legislation in Mexico
In Mexico, the first organ transplant was performed in 1963 with no pre-existing
legislation. However, in 1973, a regulation of transplants was formulated for the
first time in the Sanitary Code of the United States of Mexico.
For the aim of regulating the disposal of organs, tissues and cadavers of human
beings for medical applications, scientific research and teaching purposes, the Federal
Regulation for the Disposal of Organs, Tissues and Cadavers of Human Beings was
published in 1976 [6] .
In The General Health Law published in 1984, a title on the sanitary control
of the disposal of organs, tissues and bodies of human beings was included. In this
title, the characteristics of procurement, selection, and transplantation of organs and
tissues were specified, in order to regulate such activities throughout the national
territory.
With the purpose of establishing mechanisms for concerted actions to promote
and facilitate the procurement of organs, tissues, and human bodies, a collaboration
agreement between the Secretariat of Health, the National Institute of Nutrition
“Salvador Zubira´n,” and the Mexican Red Cross “Guillermo Barroso” was signed
in 1990. Also, between 1991 and 1994, collaboration agreements were established
between the Secretariat of Health and the State Governments, in order to carry out,
at the state level, the National Program of Transplants.
In 1999, the National Transplant Council (CONATRA) began operations as an
intersecretarial commission of the federal public administration, with the objective of
promoting, supporting, and coordinating actions with regard to transplants carried
out by the healthcare institutions of the public, social, and private sectors. In
2000, the Federal Government established the National Center for Transplantation
(CENATRA), which was assigned the sanitary control of donations and transplants
of organs, tissues, and cells of human beings.
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In the reform of the General Health Law in 2000, it was established that
CENATRA would have the faculty to decide and monitor the allocation of organs,
tissues, and cells, and promote the culture of donation.
On June 2003, the attributions of sanitary monitoring and controlling of trans-
plant activities were transferred to the Federal Commission for the Protection against
Sanitary Risks (COFEPRIS), such that CENATRA would concentrate its efforts in
the design and coordination of the National Transplant System and its program of
action.
In 2008, the General Health Law was reformed with regard to the disposal of or-
gans, tissues, and human cadavers, such that the attribution of regulation on cadav-
ers regarding general health remain in charge of the governments of each federative
entity, as well as local authorities and within their respective territorial jurisdictions.
Furthermore, in 2009, the Federal Government acknowledged that the demand
for organs and tissues exceeded the available amount, such that it was therefore nec-
essary to implement mechanisms to ensure that the allocation became transparent.
Therefore, an agreement was published, establishing the guidelines for the allocation
and distribution of organs and tissues of cadavers of human beings for transplanta-
tion, which defined specific criteria of urgency by type of organ and tissue.
In the modification of the General Health Law of 2011, it was stated that
the governments of the federative entities would establish State Transplant Centers
(CETRA), in order to Collaborate with CENATRA in the elaboration of transplant
programs, and integrating and updating the information of the National Registry of
Transplants.
In order to update the regulations governing the disposal of organs, tissues,
and cells, the Regulation of the General Law on Health with regard to Transplants
was issued in 2014. In this regulation, the attributions of CENATRA, the aspects
of the donation for the purpose of transplants, and transplants were defined.
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2.2 Kidney failure
Kidneys filter waste and extra fluids out of the blood to make urine. When kidneys
do not work the way they should, they allow waste and water to flow back into the
blood stream instead of sending them out through the urine. This causes waste and
water to build up in the body, which can cause problems with heart, lungs, blood,
and bones.
In most cases, kidney disease is preventable, but not curable. The most com-
mon causes of kidney disease are diabetes and high blood pressure. If a person has
chronic kidney disease, meaning her or his kidneys are damaged and can not work
as well as they should, she or he may still be able to prevent kidney failure, which is
when her or his kidneys do not work at all. Kidney failure is the last (most severe)
stage of chronic kidney disease. This is why kidney failure is also called end-stage
renal disease, or ESRD for short [3].
2.2.1 Treatments
If a person has ESRD, she/he will need dialysis or a kidney transplant to survive.
It is important to know that dialysis cannot do everything that healthy kidneys do.
Therefore, even when a patient is on dialysis, she/he may experience some of the
complications of kidney failure.
There are options for treating kidney failure, including:
Hemodialysis - One treatment for kidney failure is called hemodialysis, or
“hemo” for short. This type of treatment uses a machine to clean the patient’s
blood, and it can be done at a dialysis center or at home.
Peritoneal dialysis - A treatment that uses the lining of the patient’s abdomen
(belly area), called your peritoneum, and a cleaning solution called dialysate to clean
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her/his blood. Peritoneal dialysis may be done at home or even at work if the patient
has a suitable area.
Kidney transplant - It is a surgery to give the patient a healthy kidney from
someone else’s body. A kidney transplant may come from a live donor (usually
someone the patient knows) or from a deceased donor. The healthy kidney can do
the job that the kidneys did when they were healthy [3].
As previously mentioned, kidney transplantation is the most desired and cost-
effective modality of renal replacement therapy for patients with irreversible chronic
kidney failure (end-stage renal disease, stage 5 chronic kidney disease) [1].
2.2.2 Source of donor kidneys
A donated kidney may come from someone who died and donated a healthy kidney.
A person who has died and donated a kidney is called a deceased donor. When we
mention deceased donors, we refer to two kinds: brain death donors and cardiac
death donors [38].
Brain death donors can donate most organs including the kidney because even
though they have suffered complete loss of all brain function and are clinically and
legally dead, mechanical ventilation and medications keep their heart beating and
blood flowing to their organs, meanwhile for the cardiac death donors, vital organs
quickly become unusable for transplantation, but their tissues such as bone, skin,
heart valves and corneas can be donated within 24 hours.
Donated kidneys may also come from a living donor. This person may be a
blood relative (such as a brother or sister) or non-blood relative (such as a husband
or wife). They may also come from a friend or even a stranger.
When a kidney is donated by a living person, the surgeries may be done on
the same day and can be scheduled at a convenient time for both the patient and
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the donor. A healthy person who donates a kidney can live a normal life with the
remaining healthy kidney. Since the operation is a major surgery for both the donor
and the recipient, as in any operation, there are some associated risks [38].
2.2.3 Benefits of living donor kidney transplantation
Living Donor Kidney Transplantation (LDKT) has become the preferred treatment
for those with ESRD. Organ replacement from either a live or a deceased donor
is preferable to dialysis therapy because transplantation provides a better quality
of life and improved survival rates. The advantages of live versus deceased donor
transplantation now are readily apparent as it allows for earlier transplantation and
renders best long-term survival [16].
Next we summarize LDKT benefits for patients and donors [47]:
Potential benefits to recipients
• Greater long-term survival of the transplanted kidney
• Shorter wait time for transplant, with reduction in pretransplant dialysis du-
ration
• Planned surgery
• Shorter hospital stay
• Greater likelihood of preemptive transplantation
• Less likelihood of delayed graft function
• Better quality of life
• Ability to undergo preoperative desensitization in the case of blood types ABO
or HLA incompatibility (see Appendix B)
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• Ability to assure optimal medical status with a known transplant date
Potential benefits to living donors
• Satisfaction in providing an organ that has the potential to yield the recipient
the benefits listed above
• Less time assisting with dialysis care (in cases where donors provide social
support for recipients)
• Less caregiver burden (if donor is recipient’s caregiver)
• Less financial burden (if recipient is supported by donor)
• Emotional benefit from seeing family/friend regain health
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2.3 Statistics and facts
2.3.1 Increasing of the waiting list
According to CENATRA, patients that are currently waiting for a kidney transplant,
conform more than the half of the total number of patients waiting for an organ (see
Table 2.1). The kidney has been the most demanded organ over the years, and this
is not a surprise, since CKD is one of the most catasthrofic diseases due to the in-
creasing number of cases. The main reason for such increase are the high investment
costs, limited infrastructure and human resources, late detection and high morbidity
and mortality rates [36].
Table 2.1: Number of transplants required by July 13, 2017 [12].
Organ Number of patients
Kidney 13,313
Cornea 7,731
Liver 360
Heart 46
Pancreas 10
Kidney-Pancreas 6
Kidney-Liver 2
Lung 1
Heart-Lung 1
The kidney waiting list has presented a considerable increase in the past 10
years (see Figure 2.2), this only means that there are not enough kidneys to meet
the demand and each time more people aquire CKD.
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Figure 2.2: Kidney waiting list increase in the past 10 years.
In 2016, only 23.8% of the patients in the waiting list received a transplant.
This was devastating as many patients died in the wait. Also, in the past year,
2,977 kidney transplants were reported, from which 2,126 came from living donors,
whereas only 852 from deceased donors (see Figure 2.3). This is bad, in developed
countries, 80% of transplants come from deceased donors. In Mexico, it is the other
way around, from each 10 transplants, only 2 come from deceased donors [43].
2.3.2 An estimate of the expected brain deceased
donors in Mexico
In the United States of America, in 2016, there was a total of 19,060 kidney trans-
plants, from which 13,431 came from deceased donors and 5,629 from living donors
[39]. This means that the number of brain death donors in Mexico is very low.
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Figure 2.3: Kidney transplantations in the past 10 years.
Worldwide, there should be between 50 to 80 brain death donors per million
inhabitants. From 100% of brain deaths, around 25% of them are potential donors,
the rest go to the trash due to medical contraindications, family refusal, or having
a heart attack during the process [29]. By now there is a population of 127 million
inhabitants in Mexico, therefore we should have at least 50 × 127 = 6, 350 brain
death donors per year, from them, approximately 6, 350 × 0.25 = 1, 587 should be
potential donors, where each donor can donate 2 kidneys, then there should be 3,175
kidney transplants per year, however we are still too far from that number.
In the United States, in 2016, there were 31.78 deceased donors per million
inhabitants, while in Mexico, there were only 3.99 deceased donors per million in-
habitants (considering the population of United States: 321.4 millions of inhabitants,
and the population of Mexico: 127 millions of inhabitants, the number of deceased
donors in the United States in 2016: 9,971, and in Mexico: 507 [39, 11]). The rate
of brain death donors has slighty increased in Mexico, in 2000, the rate was 2.05
deceased donors per million inhabitants [19], however, we are still too far from the
rates in developed countries.
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2.3.3 Reasons for the low rate of deceased donations
There are several reasons for the low rate of deceased donations in Mexico, one of
them is the family refusal rate to consent for organ donation of their deceased rela-
tive. Around 40 to 60% of families refuse to consent for organ donation, some factors
for refusal include: religion, culture, socioeconomic status and education level. The
main reasons for refusal, according to recent studies [43, 34], where 35 families who
refused were interviewed, are shown in Figure 2.4.
Figure 2.4: Causes of family refusals from recent study [43].
The family refusal rate is very important, but if we look carefully, when we
calculate how many deceased donors there would have been last year, in the case
all families consent for donation, considering a 60% refusal rate, we would obtain
507/0.6 = 845 total donors, which is still far from the 1,587 donors previously
calculated. There must be something else aditionally to the family refusal.
Another important reason for the low rate of deceased donations in Mexico is
the identification of potencial donors in Brain Deceased individuals. Identification of
potencial donors represents a current challenge in developing countries for two main
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barriers, first, we do not have the essencial insfrastructure neither material resources,
and second, many of the physicians in this area are not well trained. Without a
doubt, the identification and diagnosis of brain death in a timely manner, improves
the chances of obtaining organic donations [50, 45].
2.3.4 Other important facts
Next, we mention important facts regarding kidney transplantation in Mexico [10]:
• In 2015, a computer based system for the National Transplantation Registry
(SIRNT) was created. The project features 15 main modules, where many
functions are carried out, such as the registry of authorized centers and autho-
rized medical staff, the registry of patients waiting for an organ or tissue, the
registry of donation and transplantation activity at a National level, the track-
ing of each donated organ or tissue, the follow-up of transplantation results,
and the Nation Registry of Volunteer Donors.
• According to the SIRNT, the number of authorized centers for procurement,
transplantation and bank increased to 5.5%, from 477 in 2015 to 503 in 2016,
where 176 of them procure organs and 225 transplant organs and tissues.
• It was reported that 96% of patients involved in Living Donor Kidney Trans-
plantation, were still alive after 1 year post-transplantation, whereas only 89%
was alive regarding Deceased Donor Kidney Transplantation.
• In 2016, the rate of brain death donors in Nuevo Leo´n, Mexico, was 7.9 deceased
donors per million inhabitants, which doubles the national rate.
• At the end of the year 2016, 12,477 patients were registered in the waiting list
for kidney transplant and only 23.8% of them proceeded to transplantation.
• The average waiting time for a patient to receive a kidney is 30 months since
registration.
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• Regarding Living Donors Kidney Transplants, we are doing a good job, in
2016, there was 2,126 (see Figure 2.3). This means that there is 2, 126/127 =
16.74 LDKT per million inhabitants. In the United States in 2016 there was
5,629 LDKT, this means that there was 5, 629/321.4 = 17.5 LDKT per million
inhabitants. We are not too far from this number, if we had a Kidney Exchange
Market, we could increase this number.
• The first paired donation transplant in Mexico was carried out in Juarez Hospi-
tal, Mexico in January 2016, where 2 incompatible pairs and 32 medical staff
were involved. The kidney exchange was carried out simultaneously in four
surgical rooms.
• A paired donation transplant was carried out in the National Institute of Med-
ical Sciences and Nutrition, in Mexico in April, 2016, where 4 incompatible
pairs and 60 medical staff were involved. One kidney exchange was performed
one day, and the other the next day.
• The most common causes of ESRD are high blood pressure, and diabetes
mellitus [28].
• In 1966, the second kidney transplant in Mexico was performed in the “Dr.
Jose´ Eleuterio Gonza´lez” University Hospital of the Universidad Auto´noma de
Nuevo Leo´n [40].
• The average annual cost per patient undergoing hemodialysis in public units
is $158,964.00 MX. The estimated cost for the care of all population estimated
in need of renal replacement therapy (via hemodialysis) was estimated to be
$10,921,788,072.00 MX [25].
• In 2014, a kidney exchange market was proposed by Professor Alvin Roth,
Nobel Prize laureate, during the master lecture entitled: “Market design for
the kidney exchange” carried out in Hospital ABC. He stated that Mexico has
more living donor kidney transplants than the United States, and that they
might exchange kidneys in the future [37].
Chapter 3
The Kidney Exchange Problem
3.1 Problem statement
As previously mentioned, kidney transplant is the best treatment option for patients
with kidney failure. These patients may have a donor willing to donate, however
kidneys may not be compatible due to blood type incompatibility or positive cross-
match. We call a pair of patient and his/her incompatible donor an Incompatible
Patient-Donor Pair (PDP). A pool of these PDPs is called a Kidney Exchange Pool
[35].
Figure 3.1: 2-cycle kidney exchange.
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The idea of kidney exchange provided new hope for kidney failure patients.
Suppose we have two pairs of incompatible patient-donors: PDP-1 and PDP-2
(shown in Figure 3.1, where Dx and Rx denote the donor and the recipient of
PDP-x, respectively). If the kidney of Donor 1 is compatible with Patient 2, and
that of Donor 2 is compatible with Patient 1, then the two PDPs can exchange
kidneys. We call this a 2-way exchange (or, mathematically, a 2-cycle, see Figure
3.1) [35].
Figure 3.2: 3-cycle kidney exchange.
Cycles may have cardinality 2, 3 (see Figure 3.2), or more. With the introduc-
tion of altruistic donors (donors who do not have patients associated with them),
chains may be formed (see Figure 3.3). Mathematically, the Kidney Exchange Prob-
lem (KEP) is a combinatorial optimization problem that can be defined on a directed
graph, and typically concerns solutions with either just cycles, or cycles and chains.
The way the KEP works is as follows. Let us suppose we have a pool of PDPs,
we seek to optimize this pool as to find the maximum number of kidney exchanges.
There are different approches for the KEP. For example, in some approaches, the
objective is to maximize the arc weights defined by a solution, while in others, failure
probabilities are considered [23].
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As we previously mentioned, cycles may have any size; however, some consider-
ations and restrictions need to be taken. A donor, as soon as the partner patient has
received a kidney, can technically exit the program without donating one, as he/she
is not legally bound to do so. To avoid this from happening, usually exchanges are
carried out simultaneously. As each transplant involves two surgeries, there is a limit
as to how many exchanges can be performed at once, due to human resource and
logistic reasons. We use k to represent the maximum number of transplants that
can be carried out concurrently (i.e., a k-way exchange).
The standard model for kidney exchange encodes a kidney exchange pool as
a directed compatibility graph G = (V,E) by associating one vertex v ∈ V to each
PDP. A directed arc e = (vi, vj) ∈ E from vi to vj is added if the donor of PDP vj is
compatible (and may donate) with the patient of PDP vj. A donor is willing to give
her kidney if and only if the corresponding patient in the same vertex vi receives a
kidney. The weight we of an edge e represents the utility to vj of obtaining vi’s donor
kidney. The criteria used to assign weights to edges is determined by a committee
of medical professionals, and takes into account such factors as donor and patient
location, health, CPRA score, etc. [23]. A cycle c in the graph G represents a
possible kidney swap, with each vertex in the cycle obtaining the kidney from the
previous vertex. If cycle c includes k PDPs, we refer to it as a k-cycle [23].
Figure 3.3: An example of a chain.
Chapter 3. The Kidney Exchange Problem 27
With altruistic donors, the KEP digraph becomes more complex. A sequence
of kidney exchanges that begins from an altruistic donor and terminates at the “wait-
list” (which usually refers to the deceased donor waiting list) forms a chain [35] (see
Figure 3.3 where WL denotes the waiting list). Chains can be (and typically are)
longer than cycles in practice because it is not necessary to carry out all the trans-
plants in a chain simultaneously [23].
Figure 3.4: An example of a kidney exchange pool.
Figure 3.5: An example of a solution associated to the pool from Figure 3.4
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In Figure 3.5 we can see the solution obtained after optimizing the problem in
Figure 3.4 (solving the KEP) taking a pool of incompatible pairs (denoted by the
yellow and green circles) and altruistic donors (denoted by the blue circles). We can
see in Figure 3.5 that a 2-way cycle (P13 − P15), a 3-way cycle (P8 − P9 − P10),
and a 4-way cycle (P3−P4−P5−P6) were found. Also 2 chains were found, where
altruistic donor A1 triggers a chain (A1 − P16 − P18 − P19 − P20 −WL) ending
in the waiting list. This chain was not simultaneous, as donor in P18 (often called
bridge donor) has to wait to donate, after his associated recipient receives a kidney.
Also altruistic donor A2, triggers another chain (A2 − P11 − P14 −WL). We can
also see that PDP’s P1, P2, P7, P12 and P17, did not find a match.
3.2 Clearing algorithms
The KEP concerning cycle and chains, and cycles only, are interesting combinatorial
optimization problems in their own rights. In the literature we can find different
operations research approaches to KEP variations.
Among integer programming formulations concerning cycles only we can men-
tion the well known Cycle Formulation and the Edge Formulation. They were pro-
posed independently by Abraham, Blum and Sandholm [2] and Roth, So¨nmez and
U¨nver [44], respectively. The Cycle Formulation considers one variable for each cy-
cle and uses an exponential number of variables (one per each cycle). The Edge
Formulation considers a variable for each edge and uses an exponential number of
constraints. Both formulations allow cycles to have length at most 3.
Among integer programming formulations concerning cycles and chains, we
can mention two models proposed by Anderson et al. [4]. The first model is an
arc-based formulation, in which a binary variable represents chains as well as cycles.
The second model is inspired by the Prize Collecting Traveling Salesman Problem
(PC-TSP) [8, 33]. The substantial difference with the TSP is that now, we are
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allowed to form a cycle excluding some cities by paying a penalty [42]. In these
formulations, the length of chains is unbounded while only cycles of length at most
3 are allowed.
There are of course operations research techniques other than integer program-
ming (e.g., game theory or heuristic methods) that have been studied in the literature
for various aspects/forms of the KEP [35]. Among these we can cite the works of
Biro´ et al. [9], Zenios et al. [48], Chen et al. [13], Dickerson et al. [22], Ashlagi et
al. [5], and Gentry et al. [30]. Most recently, there have been studies considering
situations where failure probabilities are taken into account and fairness issues are
considered for patients hard to match [23, 24]. Next, we present the Cycle Formu-
lation by Dickerson et al. [21] , which is the one we use for solving the KEP in this
thesis.
3.2.1 Cycle formulation
An alternative IP model for the edge formulation is the so called Cycle Formulation
[14]. Let C(k) be the set of all cycles in G with length at most k. We assume that
a cycle is an ordered set of arcs. Define a variable zc for each cycle c ∈ C(k):
zc =


1, if cycle c is selected for the exchange
0, otherwise
Denote by V (c) ⊆ V the set of vertices which belong to cycle c. The model
can be written as follows (where wc =
∑
(i,j)∈cwij):
Maximize
∑
c∈C(k)
wczc (3.1)
subject to
∑
c:i∈V (c)
zc 6 1 ∀i ∈ V (3.2)
zc ∈ {0, 1} ∀c ∈ C(k). (3.3)
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In the case of unitary weights, wc equals the number of edges in c, i.e., the num-
ber of transplants associated with cycle c. The objective function (3.1) maximizes
the weighted number of transplants. Constraints (3.2) ensure that every vertex is
in at most one of the selected cycles (i.e., each donor may donate, and each patient
may receive only one kidney). Compared to the Edge Formulation [14], the difficulty
with this formulation is induced by the exponential number of variables. Indeed, the
number of cycles can grow exponentially with k.
The KEP under these conditions is not easy to solve, it takes a lot of com-
putational effort and sophisticated algorithms to solve. When we consider cycles
of cardinality k > 2, the problem is NP complete. Only for the cases when k = 2
and not chains are allowed, or k = ∞ the problem can be solved in polynomial
time. However significantly better (i.e., higher cardinality) results are found with
k = 3 over k = 2, so solving the NP-complete version of the problem is necessary in
practice [20].
Chapter 4
Description of the Simulation
Framework
4.1 Introduction
Having stated all statistics to date regarding kidney transplantation in Mexico, we
can see that the number of living donor transplants is much higher than the number
of deceased donor transplants. We can also see that the waiting list has been increas-
ing over the years and although the number of transplants has also been increasing,
it is still not enough to satisfactorily deal with the waiting list.
A kidney exchange market would help alleviate the waiting list as those who
aquire CKD or ESRD, and have a willing but incompatible donor, could join this
kidney exchange market instead of the waiting list. Also those who already are in he
waiting list and have an incompatible donor, may join the kidney exchange market.
But, how can we be certain that a kidney exchange market would be a suitable
alternative? how many incompatible pairs would emerge during a year? how many
incompatible pairs would be served by kydney exchange?
The first question is not hard to answer. The kidney exchange market is not
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new, many countries including the United States, United Kingdom, Spain, etc. have
a kidney exchange market implemented and has been working during several years.
Also in Mexico last year, 2- and 4-way kidney exchanges were successfully performed
without a kidney exchange market [10].
The second and third questions are harder to answer, as there is not any data
regarding incompatible pairs. In this chapter we try to answer these questions and
prove that a kidney exchange market would benefit a large amount of patients.
4.2 Methods
To simulate the number of incompatible pairs that would emerge during a year, we
need to go deep inside and think as in real life. In real life, individuals diagnosticated
with CKD or ESDR, are recommended to have a kidney transplant. If that is the
case, and they have someone willing to donate, they go to the hospital, both patient
and donor, where they are subject to a blood test. If the result turns out to be
compatible, the first filter is passed; however, they are not ready yet to proceed to
transplant.
The donor needs to be examined to verify that he is healthy enough to do-
nate, also he needs to take a psychological test to check weather he is not being
forced to donate and warn him about possible risks during transplantation and post-
transplantation. After these barriers, there is an additional one, the crossmatch test
(see Appendix B). If a donor passes all these barriers, then donor and recipient may
proceed to a direct donation transplant. If donor fails in any step, patient have 2 op-
tions, he goes to the waiting list to wait for a deceased donor, or he can bring another
donor willing to donate and have him through all procedure of transplantation.
Basically, that is what we do in this simulation. We simulate families, begining
with the intended patient and his two parents [31]. Possible candidates to donate
included in this simulation are parents, siblings of recipient, spouse, children and
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others (friends, unrelated family, etc.). We assign an age to the patient in order to
select potential donors from the donor pool. We consider 3 age groups: Youngs (17
or less), Adults (18-49) and Olds (50 or more). Each age group is assigned a donor-
patient relationship distribution, for example, a young patient has more probability
of having a parent as a donor, than an old patient, also, an old patient has more
probability of having a child as donor, than a young patient.
Now that we have assigned an age to the patient, we randomly select 2 donors
from the donor candidate pool (in the simulation, we always consider 2 donors
for each patient) according to the donor-patient relationship distribution previously
described.
Then we assign a blood type to the patient and to each donor candidate. First,
parents, spouse and others, are randomly assigned blood type according to Mexican
population blood type distribution. Then, patient and siblings inherit bloodtype
according to parents blood types and some inheritance rules. Now having the blood
types of the patient and spouse, children inherit a blood type from them.
All information gathered is based on OPTN [39], Lorenzo [18], Gentry [31],
Fehrman [27], and Zenios [49].
4.2.1 Decision tree
So now that we have selected 2 donors from the candidate pool and we have assigned
blood types to the patient and donors, we proceed to the decision tree model of Zenios
[49] (see Figure 4.1).
We have the first step of the decision tree now completed, which is to specify
the number of willing donors and their relationship to the recipient. The second step
is to select blood type compatible donors (blood types had been previously assigned
to donors and patient), what we do here is to take a blood test for each donor and
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the patient, and check compatibility. So now that we know if donor 1 and donor
2 are compatible or not, we proceed to step 3. Here in the medical work-up we
determine weather the donor is healthy enough and willing to donate.
Figure 4.1: Decision tree model.
For ABO compatible donors who pass the medical work-up, there is still one
more barrier, that is the crossmatch test. Following we list the possible outcomes
for the decision tree:
• Donor fails the medical work-up and becomes non-viable donor.
• ABO incompatible donor passes medical work-up and joins exchange program.
• ABO compatible donor passes medical work-up but fails crossmatch test and
joins exchange program.
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• ABO compatible donor passes medical work-up and crossmatch test and goes
through direct donation.
Next, we describe each step in detail, and provide distributions and probabili-
ties used in this simulation.
4.2.2 Age assignment and donor selection
Table 4.1: U.S. Transplants performed: January 1, 1988 - May 31, 2017, based on
OPTN data as of june 19, 2017.
Patient age / Youngs Adults Olds
Donor relation <17 18-49 50+ Total
Parent 7,064 11,317 102 18,483
% (75.16%) (15.68%) (0.2%) (14%)
Child 0 3,251 18,936 22,187
% (0%) (4.5%) (37.57%) (16.81%)
Sibling 668 31,970 9,704 42,342
% (7.11%) (44.29%) (19.25%) (32.08%)
Spouse 0 7,784 7,426 15,210
% (0%) (10.78%) (14.73%) (11.52%)
Other 1,666 17,854 14,239 33,759
% (17.73%) (24.74%) (28.25%) (25.58%)
Total 9,398 7,276 50,407 131,981
% (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Age distribution 7.12% 54.69% 38.19% 100%
As previously described, we assign an age to patients based on age distribu-
tion. This data has been obtained from OPTN [39] and corresponds to a data set
reported from January 1, 1988 to May 31, 2017 which includes a total of 141,492
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pairs who have been through living donor transplantation. In this report, there are
16 categories for the donor relation, and 8 categories for patient age. I summarized
everything into a table of 6 categories for the donor relation and 3 categories for the
age of the patient (see Table 4.1).
Figure 4.2: Donor-patient relationship distribution.
In the OPTN report, I ignored the “Not reported” and the “Unknown” cate-
gories for the donor relation. I combined the “Biological, related identical twin”, “Bi-
ological, blood related Full Sibling” and “Biological, blood related Half Sibling” into
the Sibling category. Also combined the “Biological, blood related Other Relative”,
“Non-Biological, Life Partner” and “Non-Biological, Other Unrelated Directed” into
the Other category. I also summarized the 8 age categories into 3 categories which
I called: Youngs, Adults and Olds. In Figure 4.2 we have a better visualization of
donor-patient relationship distribution upon patient age group.
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Once an age group has been assigned to the patient, and having these distri-
butions according to each age group, we can now randomly select 2 donors from the
donor candidate pool and proceed with the blood type assignment.
4.2.3 Blood type assignment
After having assigned an age to the patient and selected the two donors, the next
step is to assign them a blood type.
It was challenging to find data regarding Mexican population blood type dis-
tribution, since there are not any online databases available. However, a calculated
average of blood type distribution for Mexican population is obtained from particu-
lar studies on 19 states in Mexico [18] see Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Blood type distribution of Mexican population.
ABO group %
A 25.0
B 8.6
AB 1.4
O 65.0
However, as in this simulation we consider inheritance probabilities to deter-
mine children blood types, having the blood type distribution would not suffice to
determine children blood types. We need to know parents genotypes in order to
know such inheritance probabilities. A child randomly inherits one allele from each
parent, meaning that child genotype will be a combination of these two alleles (see
Appendix A).
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4.2.3.1 Genotypes
In order to obtain genotype frequencies, we first need to obtain allele frequencies.
We can determine that using the Hardy-Weinberg principle (see Appendix C), ob-
taining the following results (see Table 4.3 and 4.4):
Table 4.3: Allele frequencies of Mexican population.
Allele Frequency
A 0.14
B 0.05
O 0.81
Table 4.4: Genotype frequencies of Mexican population.
Genotype %
AA 2.03
AO 22.97
BB 0.26
BO 8.27
AB 1.46
OO 65
4.2.3.2 Assignment
We first assign a random genotype to the parents, spouse, and others according to
the genotype distribution in Table 4.4. Having now the genotypes of the parents,
patient, and siblings randomly inherit an allele from each parent. Then having now
assigned genotypes to the patient and spouse, children inherit genotype from them.
In Figure 4.3 there is an example of genotype drawing of the whole pool of donor
candidates. Nodes highlighted in yellow represent candidates whose genotype is
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randomly assigned, whereas non-highlighted nodes represent candidates who inherit
their genotypes from their respective parents.
Figure 4.3: Genotype assignment example.
4.2.4 Blood test
Now that we have selected the 2 donors and having assigned blood types to patient
and donors, we can certainly know weather donors are ABO compatible or incom-
patible to the patient according to the ABO compatibility Table 4.5.
Table 4.5: Blood type compatibility table.
Blood type Can receive from Can give to
O O ALL
A A, O A, AB
B B, O B, AB
AB ALL AB
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4.2.5 Medical work-up
Regardless blood test results, both patients have a medical work-up. This is to
determine medical ineligibility or donor unwillingness to donate. We discard 25% of
spousal donors and 56.7% of other donors [31, 49], according to a published paper
[27] where reasons for not accepting living kidney donors were studied.
If donor is ABO incompatible and passes the medical work-up, he joins the
exchange program pool. If donor is ABO compatible and passes the medical work-
up, she/he still has to take the crossmatch test. However if any donor fail the medical
work-up, they become a non-viable donor, then they disappear from the simulation.
4.2.6 Crossmatch test
Table 4.6: PRA distribution and simulated crossmatch likelihood based on PRA
group
Rate of positive Rate of positive
PRA group Distribution (%) XM (%) XM for wife/mother (%)
0-9 72.4 5 25
10-79 17.1 45 65
80+ 10.5 90 95
Those ABO compatible donors who pass the medical work-up, still need to take
the crossmatch test. We first assign the patient with a gender. This is important
because if patient is female, patient has more probability of failing the crossmatch
test. Gender is assinged randomly according to gender distribution where 40% pa-
tients are female [39] according to OPTN data from kidney transplants performed
from 1988 to 2017.
After assigning gender to the recipient, we assign them with a PRA group. For
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each PRA group, there is a different positive crossmatch rate, which differs when
a patient is a wife or a mother. This is mainly because wives become sensitized to
their husbands and mothers to their children. All this data is reflected in Table 4.6
(XM denotes crossmatch) [31].
If the crossmatch result turns out to be positive, donor becomes incompatible
and joins the exchange program pool. If result is negative, this means that the donor
has passed all steps and a direct transplant can be performed.
4.3 Considerations
Next, we mention some considerations about the simulation:
• Except for the spouse, other candidates (sibling, child, parent, other) may be
selected twice, this is, for example, a patient may have 2 siblings as donors.
• Patient is considered to be a mother when patient is randomly assigned a
female gender and has a child as a donor.
• Patient is considered to be a wife when patient is randomly assigned a female
gender and has a spouse as a donor.
• When neither of the two selected donors pass the medical work-up, patient is
considered to have no donors, thus patient joins the waiting list.
• When both selected donors pass the medical work-up, and both pass the cross-
match test, only one donor is randomly selected to undergo through direct
transplant.
• When both selected donors pass the medical work-up, but both donors are
incompatible with the patient (i.e. fail the blood test or crossmatch), only one
of them is randomly selected to join the exchange program.
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• When both selected donors pass the medical work-up, and one of them is com-
patible with the donor (pass the blood test and crossmatch test) and the other
is incompatible, incompatible donor dissapears from simulation and compatible
donor undergoes through direct transplant.
Chapter 5
Experimental Work
5.1 Estimation of incompatible pairs
In the previous chapter, we have reviewed the methodology for the generation of
patients and donors, the assignment of blood types, and the possible outcomes of
the simulator after several tests, which include exchange program, direct transplant
and non-viable donor. In order to estimate the number of incompatible pairs in a
year, we simulate patients and donors, until 2,126 direct transplants are realized,
which is the number of living donor kidney transplants performed last year. Once
that number is reached, we can estimate the number of expected incompatible pairs
in a year, that is, the number of pairs that would eventually joined the hypothetical
kidney exchange program [31].
Table 5.1: Predicted number of incompatible pairs in Mexico in a year.
Total number of patients generated 3,121 100.0%
Pairs who undergo through direct transplant 2,126 68.1%
Pairs who join the exchange program 995 31.9%
Pairs who join exchange program due ABO 500 50.2%
Pairs who join exchange program due crossmatch 495 49.8%
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Since this number may change with each execution, we take averages from a
sample of 30 replicates. Average results are displayed in Table 5.1.
The simulation estimated an average of 995 incompatible pairs in Mexico in a
year, which is 31.9% of the total number of generated pairs. We can also tell by the
results that from incompatible pairs, a mean of 50.2% joined the exchange program
due to blood test failure, and the rest due to crossmatch test failure.
Table 5.2: Genotype distribution on USA population.
Genotype %
AA 6.40
AO 34.80
BB 0.46
BO 9.20
AB 3.43
OO 46.14
For the purpose of comparison, we run the same experiment (simulate patients
and donors, until 2,126 direct transplants are realized) using USA blood type distri-
bution (shown in Table 5.2) obtained from Zenios [49] obtaining the following results
in Table 5.3 (from now on, we will use this blood type distribution when running
experiments regarding USA population).
Table 5.3: Estimated number of incompatible pairs in USA in a year.
Total number of patients generated 3,336 100.0%
Pairs who undergo through direct transplant 2,126 63.7%
Pairs who join the exchange program 1,210 36.3%
Pairs who join exchange program due ABO 709 58.6%
Pairs who join exchange program due crossmatch 501 41.4%
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As we can see in Table 5.2, genotype OO percentage in USA blood type distri-
bution is much lower than it is in the Mexican blood type distribution, meaning that
in the USA, there is a lower percentage of donors having genotype OO. According
to blood type compatibility (Table 4.5), donors with blood type O can donate to
anyone, then a Mexican pair has more chance of passing the blood test than an
American pair.
These results are consistent with our previous experiment where it was found
an average of 1,210 and 995 incompatible pairs in USA and Mexico, respectively. As
we can see from Table 5.3, 58.6% of incompatible pairs are due to blood test failure.
5.2 Pool characteristics
Once we have predicted the number of incompatible pairs that would arise in a year
in Mexico, we proceed to create a pool of the predicted 995 incompatible pairs.
5.2.1 Age distribution
Analyzing the age distribution in both pools in Table 5.4, we can see that there is
not much difference. In both cases, most patients in the pools fall into Adult and
Old category. Also only around 7% of them fall into the Young category.
Table 5.4: Patient age distribution in Mexican and USA pool respectively.
Young count 66 6.6% 70 7.0%
Adult count 499 50.2% 516 51.9%
Old count 430 43.2% 409 41.1%
Total 995 100.0% 995 100.0%
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5.2.2 Blood type distribution
In Tables 5.5, 5.6 and further tables, dX denotes donor blood type and rX denotes
recipient blood type.
Table 5.5: Blood type distribution of donor/recipient pairs in Mexican pool.
Pairs dO dA dB dAB Total dO dA dB dAB Total
rO 297 320 108 12 737 29.8% 32.2% 10.9% 1.2% 74.1%
rA 66 63 32 10 171 6.6% 6.3% 3.2% 1.0% 17.2%
rB 28 26 17 8 79 2.8% 2.6% 1.7% 0.8% 7.9%
rAB 2 4 1 1 8 0.2% 0.4% 0.1% 0.1% 0.8%
Total 393 413 158 31 995 39.5% 41.5% 15.9% 3.1% 100.0%
Table 5.6: Blood type distribution of donor/recipient pairs in USA pool.
Pairs dO dA dB dAB Total dO dA dB dAB Total
rO 154 337 94 18 603 15.5% 33.9% 9.4% 1.8% 60.6%
rA 70 121 56 30 277 7.0% 12.2% 5.6% 3.0% 27.8%
rB 4 51 18 26 99 0.4% 5.1% 1.8% 2.6% 9.9%
rAB 3 7 3 3 16 0.3% 0.7% 0.3% 0.3% 1.6%
Total 231 516 171 77 995 23.2% 51.9% 17.2% 7.7% 100.0%
Analyzing the blood type distribution in both pools we can find some interest-
ing information.
• Most recipients in both pools are blood type O, in Mexico 74.1% (see Table
5.5) while in USA 60.6% (see Table 5.6. This is because recipients with blood
type O can only receive blood from a donor with blood type O (see blood type
compatibility Table 4.5), so most of them have an incompatible pair.
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• In the Mexican pool there is a greater percentage of recipients with blood
type O than the USA pool, that’s because as previously said, there is a greater
percentage of OO genotype in Mexican genotype distribution than in the USA.
• In both pools, there are a very few recipients and donors with blood type AB.
Also the amount of recipients and donors with blood type A, is greater in the
USA pool than in Mexico.
5.3 Optimizing predicted incompatible pairs
Now that we have generated the pool of the predicted incompatible pairs, we proceed
to optimize it to find the maximum number of matches. For this, we used the clearing
algorithm for the Cycle Formulation (described in Chapter 3) allowing only length-2
cycles and no chains (as altruist donors are not considered). The solution algorithm
for this model was made available by John Dickerson [20]. Running one instance, the
algorithm found an objective of 624, this means that 624 pairs found a compatible
pair (in real life, not all recommended matches proceed to transplant [23]). Also,
when optimizing a pool of 995 incompatible pairs using USA blood type distribution,
the algorithm found an objective of 562. As we can see, using Mexican blood type
distribution leads to more matches due greater amount of donors with blood type
O. We verify that in the next results where we will study the characteristics of the
previous generated pools for USA and Mexico.
Chapter 5. Experimental Work 48
5.3.1 Matched pairs
Regarding matched pairs in the Mexican pool, it is not surprising that almost half
(47%) of matched pairs, are pairs where both recipient and donor are blood type O
(see Table 5.7). In the USA, matched pairs are more balanced between pairs where
patient and donor have either blood type A or blood type O (see Table 5.8).
Table 5.7: Matched pairs in Mexican pool.
Pairs dO dA dB dAB Total dO dA dB dAB Total
rO 296 67 28 0 391 47.4% 10.7% 4.5% 0.0% 62.7%
rA 66 62 30 1 159 10.6% 9.9% 4.8% 0.2% 25.5%
rB 28 26 12 1 67 4.5% 4.2% 1.9% 0.2% 10.7%
rAB 2 4 1 0 7 0.3% 0.6% 0.2% 0.0% 1.1%
Total 392 159 71 2 624 62.8% 25.5% 11.4% 0.3% 100.0%
Table 5.8: Matched pairs in USA pool.
Pairs dO dA dB dAB Total dO dA dB dAB Total
rO 154 71 5 1 231 27.4% 12.6% 0.9% 0.2% 41.1%
rA 70 120 53 4 247 12.5% 21.4% 9.4% 0.7% 44.0%
rB 4 51 13 1 69 0.7% 9.1% 2.3% 0.2% 12.3%
rAB 3 7 3 2 15 0.5% 1.2% 0.5% 0.4% 2.7%
Total 231 249 74 8 562 41.1% 44.3% 13.2% 1.4% 100.0%
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5.3.2 Unmatched pairs
In the Mexican pool, most of the unmatched pairs have a recipient with blood type
O (93.3%, see Table 5.9). This is obvious since they can only receive blood from a
donor with blood type O. In the other hand, there is only 1 unmatched pair, where
the donor is blood type O (as previously mentioned, donors with blood type O can
donate to anyone).
Table 5.9: Unmatched pairs in Mexican pool.
Pairs dO dA dB dAB Total dO dA dB dAB Total
rO 1 253 80 12 346 0.3% 68.2% 21.6% 3.2% 93.3%
rA 0 1 2 9 12 0.0% 0.3% 0.5% 2.4% 3.2%
rB 0 0 5 7 12 0.0% 0.0% 1.3% 1.9% 3.2%
rAB 0 0 0 1 1 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 0.3%
Total 1 254 87 29 371 0.3% 68.5% 23.5% 7.8% 100.0%
Table 5.10: Unmatched pairs in USA pool.
Pairs dO dA dB dAB Total dO dA dB dAB Total
rO 0 266 89 17 372 0.0% 61.4% 20.6% 3.9% 85.9%
rA 0 1 3 26 30 0.0% 0.2% 0.7% 6.0% 6.9%
rB 0 0 5 25 30 0.0% 0.0% 1.2% 5.8% 6.9%
rAB 0 0 0 1 1 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.2%
Total 0 267 97 69 433 0.0% 61.7% 22.4% 15.9% 100.0%
In the USA pool there is not any unmatched pair where donor is blood type
O. Also, as well as the Mexican pool, most of the unmatched pairs have a recipient
with blood type O (85.9%, see Table 5.10).
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5.3.3 Matching rates
The matching rates are calculated by dividing the total number of matched pairs
by the total number of pairs. This is to have an idea of the likelihood of finding a
match for each combination of blood type of patients and donors.
Table 5.11: Matching rate in Mexican pool.
Pairs dO dA dB dAB Total
rO 99.7% 20.9% 25.9% 0.0% 53.1%
rA 100.0% 98.4% 93.8% 10.0% 93.0%
rB 100.0% 100.0% 70.6% 12.5% 84.8%
rAB 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 87.5%
Total 99.7% 38.5% 44.9% 6.5%
Table 5.12: Matching rate in USA pool.
Pairs dO dA dB dAB Total
rO 100.0% 21.1% 5.3% 5.6% 38.3%
rA 100.0% 99.2% 94.6% 13.3% 89.2%
rB 100.0% 100.0% 72.2% 3.8% 69.7%
rAB 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 66.7% 93.8%
Total 100.0% 48.3% 43.3% 10.4%
We can see in Tables 5.11 and 5.12 that when donor is blood type O, the pair
has almost 100% probability of finding a match. The same situation happens when
recipient is blood type AB. In the other hand, the lowest probability of finding a
match is when donor is blood type AB.
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5.4 Incompatible pairs in the waiting list
Certainly, many patients are in the waiting list because they do not have any willing
donor. Also, there are patients waiting for a kidney who might have a willing but
incompatible donor, that would be candidates for joining a kidney exchange program.
However, the amount of these is not known.
We can estimate how many patients have an incompatible donor in the waiting
list using the simulator. In order to do this, we simulate patients until the sum of
pairs who join the exchange program and the patients without donor, equals the
number of patients in the waiting list (13,313 as of July, 2017 [12]).
As previously done, averages were taken over a sample of 30 replicates. Results
are displayed in Table 5.13.
Table 5.13: Estimated number of incompatible pairs in Mexico in the waiting list.
Total number of patients in the waiting list 13,313 100.0%
Patients without donor 7,351.5 55.2%
Pairs who join the exchange program 5,961.5 44.8%
Pairs who join exchange program due ABO 2,996 50.3%
Pairs who join exchange program due crossmatch 2,965.5 49.7%
As we can see in previous results, there is a large value of estimated amount
of patients in the waiting list with an incompatible donor (44.8%). However, since
there is not any kidney exchange market implemented, they do not have another
alternative but wait for a kidney in the waiting list.
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5.5 Impact of a kidney exchange market
We have estimated the number of incompatible pairs that would arise in Mexico
during a year, and the number of patients with an incompatible donor in the wait-
ing list. However, in real life, not all patients with an incompatible donor will join
the kidney exchange program [46]. Neither all recommended matches will proceed
to transplant [23]. In order to estimate the potential future impact of a hypothetical
kidney exchange market in Mexico, we carry out a simulation under the assumptions
shown in Table 5.14.
Table 5.14: Assumptions for the estimation of the impact of a kidney exchange
program.
Year Amount of pairs who join the kidney exchange program
2018 10% of patients with incompatible donor in the waiting list
50% of new patients with incompatible donor
2019 20% of patients with incompatible donor in the waiting list
60% of new patients with incompatible donor
2020 40% of patients with incompatible donor in the waiting list
70% of new patients with incompatible donor
2021 60% of patients with incompatible donor in the waiting list
80% of new patients with incompatible donor
2022+ 80% of patients with incompatible donor in the waiting list
80% of new patients with incompatible donor
These assumptions are under the consideration that a kidney exchange program
would be implemented in Mexico starting in the year 2018. They are made thinking
that a fewer amount of incompatible pairs regarding the waiting list (compared to
new incoming incompatible pairs) would join the kidney exchange program at the
beginning, since they do not know about this new alternative. New incoming patients
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may have more chance of knowing about the kidney exchange program since doctors
may explain and offer these patients the alternative of kidney exchange at the time
they find out their willing donor is incompatible. As time goes on, the amount of
incompatible pairs joining the kidney exchange program would increase, as more
people will know about this alternative.
Also, we assume the following:
• 20% of unmatched incompatible pairs leave the kidney exchange program every
year.
• 60% of recommended matchings do not proceed to transplant.
In reality, not all of the recommended matches proceed to transplantation, due
to varying levels of sensitization between candidates and donors in the pool, illness,
uncertainty in medical knowledge, logistical problems, and patient receiving a kidney
from the waiting list or another exchange [23].
We have data regarding the number of transplants carried out in Mexico each
year until 2016 and also the size of the waiting list. The waiting list has been growing
constantly each year as we have seen in previous chapters. A yearly average growth
over the last 8 years has been calculated, obtaining an average growth of 877 patients
in the waiting list. This means that, since in 2016 there was 12,477 patients in the
waiting list [11], at the end of 2017 we expect 13,354 patients in the waiting list.
Also using the same methodology, we expect 2,186 living donor kidney transplants
at the end of 2017.
Starting with the data we have and considering the given assumptions, we
simulate pools every year, and then optimize them to find the maximum number
of matchings. Unmatched pairs will stay in the pool for the following years. We
start with the predicted 995 incompatible pairs at the end of 2018 and the predicted
5,961 incompatible pairs in the waiting list. Each year, there will be 995 new incom-
patible pairs, however, only a precentage of them (depending on the year and the
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assumptions from Table 5.14), would join the kidney exchange program. Regarding
the waiting list, there will not be more incompatible pairs, only those predicted will
stay in the pool until they find a match or leave the kidney exchange program. Next
we present the results for each year in Tables 5.15 and 5.16.
Table 5.15: Calculation of incompatible pairs served by kidney exchange from 2018
to 2023.
Year 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
New IP 497 597 696 796 796 796
IP from WL 596 1,072 1,716 1,545 824 164
Total pairs 1,093 2,327 3,813 4,635 4,408 3,613
Matched 678 1,443 2,364 2,873 2,733 2,240
Transplanted 271 577 945 1,149 1,093 896
Remaining in pool 822 1,750 2,867 3,485 3,315 2,717
Remaining in WL 5,364 4,291 2,575 1,030 206 41
Table 5.16: Calculation of incompatible pairs served by kidney exchange from 2024
to 2028.
Year 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028
New IP 796 796 796 796 796
IP from WL 32 6 1 0 0
Total pairs 3,002 2,608 2,366 2,220 2,131
Matched 1861 1,617 1,467 1,376 1,321
Transplanted 744 647 586 550 528
Remaining in pool 2,257 1,961 1,779 1,669 1,603
Remaining in WL 8 1 0 0 0
We denote in Tables 5.15 and 5.16, incompatible pairs as “IP” and waiting
list as “WL”. Total pairs each year is the sum of the new incompatible pairs and
incompatible pairs from the waiting list that join the kidney exchange program
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regarding that year. Also the addition of 80% of unmatched pairs for the last year
(as 20% of them are supposed to leave the pool). Now having a pool of the total pairs
each year, we optimize it and find the maximum number of matches, however only
40% of these matches proceed to transplant. The remaining unmatched pairs (pool
of incompatible pairs) for each particular year equals the total number of pairs for
that year minus the number of transplanted pairs. The remaining incompatible pairs
in the waiting list for each year is equal to the remaining number of incompatible
pairs of the past year minus the number of incompatible pairs in the waiting list
that joined the kidney exchange program in that year.
Figure 5.1: Estimation of LDKT in the next 10 years.
In Figure 5.1 we can see how the number of transplants regarding living donors
increases dramatically compared to last years previous to 2018. Since the hypo-
thetical implementation of the kidney exchange program in 2018, the number of
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transplants keeps increasing until 2021, where it stabilizes. At this point, based on
the simulation, we can confirm that a lot of patients would benefit from a kidney
exchange program in the next years once it is implemented.
Figure 5.2: Estimation of patients in waiting list in the next 10 years.
In Figure 5.2 we can see how the waiting list, as seen in previous chapters,
increases constantly. However with the implementation of the kidney exchange pro-
gram in 2018, it will keep increasing until 2019. Then it will start decreasing until
2022. It decreases because initially, there is a large amount of incompatible pairs
in the waiting list, and having a big pool of incompatible pairs, more patients find
a match and get transplanted, overpassing the average growth in the waiting list.
However, as patients get transplanted or leave the pool, pool becomes smaller, then
the waiting list will start increasing again but at a lower rate (see Tables 5.15 and
5.16).
Chapter 6
Conclusions
6.1 Main findings and conclusions
The waiting list has been constantly increasing over the years, this is devastating,
as many people with kidney failure die waiting for a transplant. According to the
statistics studied, many organs go to trash due to families refusal to consent to organ
donation from their deceased relative. Also the rate of deceased donors is very low
in Mexico compared to other countries. Families need to be educated, they need
to know more about transplantation, in my own experience, people prefer dyalisis
than transplantation even if they have a willing donor, and that is because they
are afraid to get transplanted or they just not consider transplantation as an option.
Also, some physicians should be trained enough in order to detect potential deceased
donors.
A kidney exchange program would also help to deal with the waiting list, and
would decrease the growing rate each year. In this thesis we address the impact
that a kidney exchange program would have in Mexico. As demonstrated in previ-
ous chapters with the simulation and some assumptions, if we implement a kidney
exchange program in Mexico, a lot of patients would benefit from it. We could save
many lives. Some succesful kidney exchanges were carried out in 2016 in Mexico
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without a kidney exchange program. This means that a kidney exchange program
would have a great impact in Mexico.
Based on the simulations, we have predicted a mean of 995 incompatible pairs
that would arise in Mexico each year and about 5,961 (44.8% of the waiting list)
patients in the waiting list that would have an incompatible donor. We would have
a huge pool of incompatible pairs, and fortunately, according to the Mexican blood
type distribution, it would be easier to find a match compared to other countries.
According to the results of the simulation, we could have a dramatic increase
of living donor kidney transplants in the following years once the kidney exchange
program is implemented. Also, the waiting list would start to decrease for the first
time, which could be a great benefit, since it has been constantly increasing each
year.
A transparent database should also be implemented online in Mexico, such as
UNOS. Very important findings would arise to help patients in need of a transplant.
6.2 Future work
The simulation carried out in the present study always considers two donors per
patient, as there is no current information about a distribution of how many donors
patients may have. It would be a good idea to try to find out this distribution.
Medical work-up and crossmatch probabilities are taken from papers regarding
USA population. It also would be a great idea to do some research about these
probabilities pertaining to Mexican population.
The final part of the study was based on assumptions shown in Table 5.14. It
would be very interesting to carry out a sensitivity analysis for different values of
the parameters.
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Another line of work worthwhile pursuing is to carry out a similar study but
considering failure probabilities. This study was based on solving deterministic KEP
models which is a common approach in the literature. However, with recent studies
on developing mathematical problems for kidney exchange under uncertainty, it
would be very interesting to study the possible sources of uncertainty from the
Mexican population or eventual kidney exchange programs.
This thesis should provide a good starting point for these possible futures lines
of work.
Appendix A
Blood Types
The material of the present appendix is taken from [7]. Our blood is composed of
blood cells and an aqueous fluid known as plasma. Human blood type is determined
by the presence or absence of certain identifiers on the surface of red blood cells.
These identifiers, also called antigens, help the body’s immune system to recognize
it’s own red blood cell type. There are four main ABO blood type groupings (also
known as phenotypes): A, B, AB, and O. These blood groups are determined by
the antigen on the blood cell surface and the antibodies present in the blood plasma
(see Table A.1). Antibodies (also called immunoglobulins) are specialized proteins
that identify and defend against foreign intruders to the body. Antibodies recognize
and bind to specific antigens so that the foreign substance can be destroyed by other
immune cells.
Table A.1: Antigens and antibodies according to ABO type.
ABO Antigen Antigen Antibody Antibody
blood type A B anti-A anti-B
A YES NO NO YES
B NO YES YES NO
O NO NO YES YES
AB YES YES NO NO
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Human blood type is determined by co-dominant alleles [17]. An allele is one of
several different forms of genetic information that is present in our DNA at a specific
location on a specific chromosome. There are three different alleles for human blood
type (although there are three alleles possible, each person only has two genes for
every trait), known as IA, IB, and i. For simplicity, we can call these alleles A (for
IA), B (for IB), and O (for i).
Table A.2: Phenotypes and genotypes.
Genotype Phenotype
AA A
AO A
BB B
BO B
AB AB
OO O
These DNA codings determine distinct traits that can be passed on from par-
ents to offspring through sexual reproduction. These multiple alleles are passed from
parent to offspring such that one allele is inherited from each parent (see Table A.3).
A description of the pair of alleles in our DNA is called the genotype. Since there
are three different alleles, there are a total of six different genotypes at the human
ABO genetic locus (genetic makeup of inherited alleles) see Table A.2. The A and B
alleles are dominant to the O allele. When both inherited alleles are O, the genotpye
is homozygous recessive and the blood type is O. When one of the inherited alleles
is A and the other is B, the genotype is heterozygous and the blood type is AB. AB
blood type is an example of co-dominance since both traits are expressed equally.
Due to the fact that a person with one blood type may produce antibodies
against another blood type, it is important that individuals be given compatible
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Table A.3: Possible genotypes from inheritance of 1 allele from each parent.
Parent alleles A B O
A AA AB AO
B AB BB BO
O AO BO OO
blood types for transfusions. For example, a person with blood type B makes an-
tibodies against blood type A. If this person is given blood of type A, his or her
type A antibodies will bind to the antigens on the type A blood cells and initiate a
cascade of events that will cause the blood to clump together. This can be deadly
as the clumped cells can block blood vessels and prevent proper blood flow in the
cardiovascular system. Since people with type AB blood have no A or B antibodies
in their blood plasma, they can receive blood from persons with A, B, AB, or O
type blood.
Appendix B
HLA, PRA, and Crossmatch
B.1 HLA
The material of the present appendix is taken from [39]. HLA stands for Human
Leukocyte Antigen. HLA antigens are substances, usually a protein, found on the
surface of our cells that stimulate the production of antibodies. These antigens are
referred to with a letter and a number such as A2 or B23.
Each person’s HLA make-up is unique. You inherit it from your parents. If
something foreign is introduced into your body, your immune system recognizes the
foreign intruder and mounts an antibody attack against it. In the case of an organ
transplant, the body will recognize the HLA antigens on the transplanted organ as
not being the same as its own, and form specific antibodies against those particular
HLA antigens.
HLA is important in organ transplantation for two main reasons:
First, a body may reject any transplanted organ (eg, kidney, pancreas, heart,
lung, liver, and intestine) because the recipient’s immune system recognizes the
organ as foreign and initiates a rejection response (this can be in the form of antibody
production) which could eventually destroy the organ. Patients receive anti-rejection
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drugs after a transplant to prevent antibodies from forming.
Second, because of previous medical events, some patients have already devel-
oped antibodies to specific HLA antigens. For example, if a candidate has developed
a specific antibody to the HLA antigen A2, that person is said to be ”sensitized” to
the A2 antigen. If a donor organ that displayed the A2 antigen were placed in that
candidate, there may be an immediate rejection response (a hyperacute response)
which would lead to the rejection of the transplanted organ.
It is not easy to become sensitized to human HLA antigens. Most people
waiting for a transplant (around 80%) are not sensitized. Patients can become
sensitized to HLA antigens because of:
• Pregnancies. About 30-50% of women with three or more pregnancies will
develop HLA antibodies. In some women the antibodies could be present for
just a short time (weeks to months), while in others they may persist for many
years.
• Blood transfusions. About 50% of patients who receive multiple transfusions
will develop antibodies. Today, most patients who require blood transfusions
receive filtered blood, which decreases the chances for a patient to become
sensitized.
• Previous transplant. About 90% of patients develop HLA antibodies within
two weeks of a failed graft. However, by the time the patient is relisted (some
will have ”lost” their antibodies.
• Viral/bacterial infections. There are some reports that patients with virus
infections develop HLA antibodies, although this is relatively rare.
After HLA is determined, there is a second test which will indicate if there
is specific immune reactivity between the donor and recipient. This test is the
“crossmatch” [39].
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B.2 PRA
PRA stands for Panel Reactive Antibodies. In order to determine whether or not a
patient already has any specific HLA antibodies, a lab specialist will test a patient’s
blood (serum) against lymphocytes (white blood cells) obtained from a panel of
about 100 blood donors. These 100 donors represent the potential HLA makeup for
a donor from that area. Percent PRA (%PRA) is the number of reactions within
that panel. If a candidate’s serum does not react with any of the donor samples, the
candidate is not sensitized and has a PRA of 0. If a candidate’s serum reacts in 80
out of 100 samples, the patient has a PRA of 80%. Theoretically, that means that
if a donor becomes available from that donor pool, the recipient would experience
acute rejection 8 out of 10 times. That patient might have to wait a very long time
until a compatible donor becomes available [39].
B.3 Crossmatch
The crossmatch is a test which determines if the recipient has antibody to the po-
tential donor. The antibody will only injure the donor’s cells if it is specific for the
donor’s particular HLA. Not everyone has antibody against HLA.
The crossmatch is performed by mixing a very small amount of the patient’s
serum with a very small amount of the potential donor’s white cells [17]. Patient and
donor will have a crossmatch test multiple times, including right before transplant
surgery. If the patient has antibody to the donor’s HLA, the donor’s cells will be
injured and this is referred to as a “positive crossmatch”. A positive crossmatch is a
strong indication against transplant, since it signifies that the patient has the ability
to attack the donor’s cells, and would, most likely attack the donor’s implanted kid-
ney. A negative crossmatch indicates that the patient does not have HLA antibody
against that particular donor, and a transplant can be performed.
Appendix C
The Hardy-Weinberg Principle
C.1 Review of probability rules
We start by recalling a couple of rules for the computation of probabilities [26]. First,
for the multiplicative rule for probabilities, if two events E1 and E2 are independent
(that is, the occurrence of one event does not affect the probability of the other event
occuring), P (E1) = p1 , and P (E2) = p2, then the probability of both E1 and E2 is
P (E1 and E2) = P (E1)× P (E2)
Second, by the additive rule for probabilities, if events E1 and E2 are mutually
exclusive (that is, both cannot occur together), then the probability of either E1 or
E2 occuring is
P (E1 or E2) = P (E1) + P (E2)
Let us now shift our attention to genetic models. We consider a one-locus/two-
alleles model. Suppose the two alleles at this locus are denoted as A and a. The
frequency of allele A is the percentage (expressed in decimal form) of alleles at the
given locus which are the A allele. Denote this frequency as p. In our model, then,
the frequency of the a allele is q = 1 − p. Suppose that a population has these
frequencies of A and a. Let us now calculate the frequency of the genotypes in the
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next generation. Here, we are assuming nonoverlapping, discrete generations. The
only way for an offspring in the next generation to have genotype AA is to inherit
an A allele from each parent. The father contributes an A allele with probability p
and the mother contributes an A allele with the same probability. The probability
of both of these events is, by the Multiplication Rule for Probability (since the two
events are independent) is p× p = p2.
Similarly, the probability of both parents contributing the a allele to an off-
spring is q × q = q2 = (1 − p)2. It follows that the probability of a heterozygous
offspring is as follows. The probability that the father contributes an A allele is p
and the probability that the mother contributes an a allele is q = (1−p). So the off-
spring can have genotype Aa in this way with probability pq. However, the offspring
can have the same heterozygous genotype by getting the A allele from the mother
and the a allele from the father—also an event with probability pq. So, again, the
probability of an Aa offspring is 2pq by the addition rule of probabilities (since these
are disjoint events).
This can be summarized in Table C.1.
Table C.1: Frequency of the genotypes in the next generation
Parent alleles A(p) a(q)
A(p) AA(p2) Aa(pq)
a(q) Aa(pq) aa(q2)
Alternatively, we can accomplish the same computation by squaring p + q :
(p + q)2 = p2 + 2pq + q2 . The conclusion is that, regardless of the distribution
of genotypes in the first generation, after one generation of random mating (and
subsequently), the genotypes will be distributed according to the frequencies given
above.
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C.2 Statement of the Hardy-Weinberg
Principle
We can summerize these observations in the Hardy-Weinberg Principle:
Hardy-Weinberg Principle. Consider a population which experiences no
mutation, migration, drift, or selection with respect to a locus which contains two
possible alleles, A and a. Also assume discrete (nonoverlapping) generations. If the
frequency of allele A is p (in both sexes), then after one generation of random mating,
the genotypes and frequencies will be AA with frequency p2 , Aa with frequency 2pq,
and aa with frequency q2.
C.3 ABO blood type
Blood type is determined by three alleles at a single locus. The alleles are commonly
denoted A, B, O. These alleles combine to give the following phenotypic blood types:
AA and AO (type A), BB and BO (type B), AB (type AB), and OO (type O). Denote
the frequencies of alleles A, B, O as p, q, r respectively. Under the assumptions of
the Hardy-Weinberg Principle, we would expect the genotypic frequencies: AA with
frequency p2, AB with frequency 2pq, AO with frequency 2pr, BB with frequency
q2 , BO with frequency 2qr, and OO with frequency r2 . Notice that, again, these
frequencies can be calculated by squaring the appropriate multinomial. This time it
is (p+ q + r)2 = p2 + 2pq + 2pr + q2 + 2qr + r2 [26].
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